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The current study estimates the impact of the SAH order on violent crimes across public and residential locations: assault, battery, homicide, robbery, and sexual assault. Using interrupted time series analyses, it analyzes weekly crime data in Chicago, Illinois, from 2017 to 2020. The SAH order caused significant decreases in battery and sexual assault across public and residential locations. It also decreased assault in public locations only. Such decreases in assault, battery, and sexual assault were greater under the SAH order when social distancing was strictly enforced, as opposed to during the relaxation of social distancing. On the other hand, there were significant increases in homicide across public and residential locations. Robbery increased in public locations only. There were greater increases in homicide and robbery during the relaxation of social distancing, as opposed to under the SAH order. The study ultimately indicates that the impacts of the containment measures are conditional upon the offense location, type of crime, and level of social distancing being mandated. From a public policy perspective, it is important to allocate staffing and resources for law enforcement accordingly during the enduring pandemic.
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The concept and naming of "hate crime," and the adoption of special laws to address it, provoked controversy and raised fundamental questions when they were introduced in the 1980s. In the decades since, neither hate crime itself nor those hotly debated questions have abated. To the contrary, hate crime has increased in recent years-although the prominent target groups have shifted over time-and the debate over hate crime laws has reignited as well. The still-open questions range from the philosophical to the doctrinal to the pragmatic: What justifies the enhanced punishment that hate crime laws impose based on the perpetrator's motivation? Does that enhanced punishment infringe on the perpetrator's rights to freedom of belief and expression? How can we know or prove a perpetrator's motivation? And, most practical of all: Do hate crime laws work? This Essay proposes that we reframe our understanding of what we label as hate crimes. It argues that those crimes are not necessarily the acts of hate-filled extremists motivated by deeply held, fringe beliefs, but instead often reflect the broader, even mainstream, social environment that has marked some social groups as the expected or even acceptable targets for crime and violence. In turn, hate crimes themselves influence the social environment by reinforcing recognizable patterns of discrimination. The Essay maintains that we should broaden our understanding of the motivations for and effects of hate crimes and draws connections between hate crimes and seemingly disparate phenomena that have recently captured the nation's attention.
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Violence interrupters (VI) operate as mediators after gang-involved shootings to stop retributory shootings. While some cities, like Chicago, have seen initial success, other cities, such as Boston, Newark, and Phoenix have seen little or mixed effects. This is the first evaluation of the Washington DC intervention. I use an interrupted time series model to measure the impact the intervention had on the rates of assaults with a gun using DC Crime Incident data. Recognizing that the Covid-19 pandemic is an important confounding event, I also run two time-series control models, a location control, and an outcome control. My findings indicate that the program was not effective in reducing gun violence. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Crime & Delinquency is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)
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The aim of the study is to examine whether and how emotional intelligence and aggression vary with gender and urban-rural area in South Africa. A cross-sectional design was used. A total of 440 adolescents aged between 13-18 years old participated in the study. Stratified sampling method was used in the selection of participants. Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire and Aggression Questionnaire were used to measure emotional intelligence and aggression. The study hypotheses were tested using logistic regression analysis. Emotional intelligence varies with gender. Males managed other peoples emotions better while females managed and utilised their own emotions better. With female participants verbal aggression was higher, whereas males scored higher on physical aggression, anger aggression and hostile aggression. On the basis of location, urban adolescents were indicated to have the ability to perceive other's emotions and manage their own emotions, while rural adolescents results indicated a lesser propensity for the perception of others emotions and the management of own emotions. Both urban and rural adolescents indicated verbal aggression. Emotional intelligence and aggression vary with gender and location. Therefore, gender-specific characteristics, and location, could play a major role in how the behaviour is manifested. Based on these findings, it is concluded that intervention methods should be tailor-made to suit individual needs.
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In contrast to widespread concerns that COVID-19 lockdowns have substantially increased the incidence of domestic violence, research based on police-recorded crimes or calls-for-service has typically found small and often even negligible effects. One explanation for this discrepancy is that lockdowns have left victims of domestic violence trapped in-home with their perpetrators, limiting their ability to safely report incidents to the police. To overcome this measurement problem, we propose a model-based algorithm for measuring temporal variation in domestic violence incidence using internet search activity and make precise the conditions under which this measure yields less biased estimates of domestic violence problem during periods of crisis than commonly used police-recorded crime measures. Analysing the COVID-19 lockdown in Greater London, we find a 40% increase in our internet search-based domestic violence index at the peak occurring 3-6 weeks into the lockdown, -seven to eight times larger than the increase in police-recorded crimes and much closer to the increase in helpline calls reported by victim support charities. Applying the same methodology to Los Angeles, we find strikingly similar results. We conclude that evidence based solely on police-recorded domestic violence incidents cannot reliably inform us about the scale of the domestic violence problem during crises like COVID-19. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)
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OBJECTIVES: This study uses two cluster detection techniques to identify clusters of violent crime during the 3 months of the 2020 COVID-19 lockdown in Miami-Dade County compared to that during an equivalent period in 2018 and 2019. METHODS: Violent crime data from the Miami-Dade Central Records Bureau were analyzed. The Local Indicators of Spatial Association statistics and a space-time permutation statistic were used to identify clusters of violent crimes and outliers, and Global Moran's I tool was used to assess spatial patterning in violent crime. Neighborhood disadvantage data were obtained from the American Community Survey 5-year estimates linked with arrest locations. RESULTS: Violent crime arrests fell by 7.1% in 2020. Arrests were concentrated in predominantly Black disadvantaged neighborhoods in the northern part, and similar results were produced for core clusters by the two cluster techniques with positive global Moran's I for all study years. Although accounting for only 17% of the county population, nearly half of violent crime arrests were for Black or African American. Males comprised most violent crime arrests. CONCLUSIONS: Crime prevention and intervention efforts should be focused on both high-risk places and offenders.
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In the 1980s, Congress introduced compassionate release to counteract the increased rigidity of our federal sentencing system. This mechanism allowed courts, through a motion filed by the Bureau of Prison's director, to reduce a prisoner's sentence if "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances warrant such a reduction. However, because the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seldom brought these motions, few people were released early via compassionate release. At the same time, public discourse and concerns regarding mass incarceration have continued to grow, causing lawmakers to revisit and revise compassionate release through the First Step Act of 2018 to ensure that this mechanism's potential is fully realized.
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Purpose>The US signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act in March 2020 to alleviate the harsh economic effects of the pandemic and related shutdowns. A substantial part of the bill expanded and increased unemployment insurance payments, where a growing area of research estimates strong anti-poverty effects. The authors examine the effect of these policies on crime.Design/methodology/approach>The authors use new event study and difference-in-differences techniques to estimate the effect of increasing unemployment insurance payments on property crime and violent crime. Then, the authors estimate the effect of expanded unemployment qualification programs on crime. The authors use a rich set of controls including unemployment, contemporaneous policies and mobile device tracking data to estimate the degree to which people stayed at home.Findings>They find that increasing unemployment insurance payments decreased crime by 20%, driven by a 24% decrease in property crime. The authors also find suggestive evidence that expanding unemployment qualifications decreases crime.Practical implications>The authors find a new and substantial benefit of expanded unemployment insurance beyond their antipoverty effects.Originality/value>To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that directly examines the impact of the CARES Act on crime.
ABSTRACT
Violent crimes targeting the Asian-American/Pacific Islander (AAPI) community has increased since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. While Anti-Asian violence existed before the pandemic, few have examined the predictors of AAPI crime victimization. Given this gap in the literature, the current study examined the factors that predicted violent and nonviolent crime victimization using a sample of 342 victimization incidents from 292 individuals self-identified as AAPI in the 2019 National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The implications of this analysis for our understanding of AAPI victimization will be discussed in detail, along with future directions for research involving anti-Asian racism and violence.
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Existing research suggests that COVID-19 lockdowns tend to contribute to a decrease in overall urban crime rates. Most studies have compared pre-lockdown and post-lockdown periods to lockdown periods in Western cities. Few have touched on the fine variations during lockdowns. Equally rare are intracity studies conducted in China. This study tested the relationship between violent crime and COVID-19 lockdown policies in ZG City in southern China. The distance from the isolation location to the nearest violent crime site, called "the nearest crime distance", is a key variable in this study. Kernel density mapping and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used to compare the pre-lockdown and post-lockdown periods to the lockdown period. Panel logistic regression is used to test the fine variations among different stages during the lockdown. The result found an overall decline in violent crime during the lockdown and a bounce-back post-lockdown. Violent crime moved away from the isolation location during the lockdown. This outward spread continued for the first two months after the lifting of the lockdown, suggesting a lasting effect of the lockdown policy. During the lockdown, weekly changes in COVID-19 risk ratings at the district level in ZG City also affected changes in the nearest crime distance. In particular, an increase in the risk rating increased that distance, and a drop in the risk rating decreased that distance. These findings add new results to the literature and could have policy implications for joint crime and pandemic prevention and control.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Humans , COVID-19/epidemiology , Communicable Disease Control , Violence , Crime , Pandemics/prevention & controlABSTRACT
This research analyzes the statistically significant differences that exist between Blacks and Whites living in Atlanta via their social, economic, educational, and housing characteristics during COVID. Hypothesis tests confirmed what visual scatterplots and correlations inferred. The statistics overwhelmingly substantiate that all six of the important quality of life metrics viewed in this study are more favorable towards predominately White neighborhoods, as opposed to predominately Black neighborhoods. In particular, neighborhoods with a super majority of White residents tended to have higher life expectancies at the times of their births, sustained lower violent crime rates, held higher median household incomes, had a smaller percentage of its children living below the poverty level, had higher percentages of residents with at least a high school diploma, and maintained more occupied housing units, when compared to neighborhoods with a super majority of Black residents.
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Though the U.S. prison population has declined slightly over the last decade, progress toward decarceration has been exceedingly modest. creating or expanding mechanisms for early release from prison could help accelerate the pace of decarceration. Compassionate release-early release from prison based on a serious or terminal medical condition-is the only early release mechanism available in nearly every state. This Article uses compassionate release as a case study in the possibilities and limits of early release measures as tools for decarceration in the states. So far, decarceral reforms have largely failed to reach people convicted of violent crimes, who account for over half of the state prison population. The challenge presented by the prevalence of violent convictions is particularly acute for compassionate release. People age 55 and older, who make up a significant and growing share of people in state prisons, are the age group most likely to qualify for compassionate release. They are also the age group most likely to be incarcerated for violent convictions. This Article identifies the significant barriers that people incarcerated for violent convictions face when seeking compassionate release-even when they are not outright barred by their convictions. This Article argues that to be effective tools for decarceration, compassionate release and other early release measures must reduce the obstacles to release for people incarcerated for violent convictions. This Article models this approach with concrete suggestions for how states can reform theircompassionate release measures to reach the hardest cases.
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OBJECTIVES: The present study examines how varying levels of restrictions on the nightlife economy have impacted violent crime during the COVID-19 pandemic and the extent to which the crime preventive side-effects of restrictions are associated with the density of alcohol outlets. METHODS: The Data stems from geocoded locations of violent crimes combined with data on the density of on-premises alcohol outlets and the level of COVID-19 restrictions in Copenhagen, Denmark. We use a negative binomial count model with cluster robust standard error to assess the effect of the interaction between alcohol outlet density and COVID-related restriction levels on the nightlife economy on the frequency of violent crime. RESULTS: The article reveals how both the level of restrictions on the nightlife economy and the density of alcohol outlets significantly impacted the frequency of violent crime. The regression analysis shows that the effect of restrictions on the nightlife economy depends on the concentration of on-premises alcohol outlets in the area. In areas with a high concentration of outlets, we observe a much higher reduction in crime as consequence of the COVID-19 related restrictions. CONCLUSIONS: The results shows that a more restricted nightlife economy, including earlier closing times, could have a crime preventive effect, especially in areas with a high density of alcohol outlets.
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16 In a statement confirming the civilian deaths, Austin apologized and promised that the U.S. military would “endeavor to learn from” the error.17 Austin called for a review of the initial Defense Department investigation to determine whether it “considered all available context and information, the degree to which accountability measures need to be taken and at what level, and the degree to which strike authorities, procedures and processes need to be altered in the future.” 21 In remarks to the New York Times, Said also noted that military officials erred in believing they had located an ISIS-K safe house from which attacks were to be launched—information that led to the strike.22 Commentators have criticized the Defense Department for failing to provide more transparency about the investigation and resulting report, as well as accountability for the errors that led to the strike.23 U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl met with the U.S. charity that employed Ahmadi, and according to a Pentagon spokesman, “‘Dr. Kahl noted that the strike was a tragic mistake and that Mr. Zemari Ahmadi and others who were killed were innocent victims, who bore no blame and were not affiliated with ISIS-K or threats to U.S. forces.’” 27 Upon taking office, the Biden administration launched a review of use of force policies, including drone strikes, and reportedly paused such strikes outside conventional battlefields without presidential approval.28 Press reports suggest that although the review is not yet complete, the administration is considering a return to the Obama-era policy of “centralized interagency vetting of proposed strikes,” while maintaining the Trump-era approach of giving greater flexibility to commanders with respect to countries, such as Somalia and Afghanistan, where strikes are more routine.29 President Biden has indicated that the United States intends to continue “over-the-horizon” strikes as part of its continued counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.30 As investigations into the withdrawal from Afghanistan continue, U.S. officials face the ongoing challenge of resettling evacuated Afghans. Many left on military and charter flights to transit hubs in third countries, including Qatar, Germany, and Italy.34 In these countries, evacuees have been housed on U.S. military bases, where they undergo “biometric and biographic security screenings” in addition to COVID-19 and other health screenings.35 Press reports indicate that several dozen have been red-flagged for “apparent records of violent crime or links to Islamist militants,” and were transferred to a NATO base in Kosovo to await further decisions.36 Afghans who receive security and health clearances can travel to the United States.37 Private airlines have donated hundreds of millions of frequent flier miles to provide evacuees with free tickets to the United States.38 Most evacuees have landed at Dulles International Airport in Virginia, with some then going to live with family and many others transported to domestic military bases.39 Although private companies like Airbnb committed to provide temporary housing for 20,000 evacuees,40 tens of thousands have waited at U.S. bases for weeks or months as resettlement agencies struggle to place them in more permanent housing.41 The White House has estimated that a total of 95,000 Afghans will relocate to the United States.42 To obtain safe passage out of Afghanistan for those who wish to leave and to facilitate the reopening of the Kabul airport, the United States has maintained “regular contact” with the Taliban.43 The State Department hopes to resume regular evacuation flights before the end of 2021,44 but in the meantime, evacuees have mainly departed on charter flights, while a small subset have escaped via overland routes.45 According to the State Department, “Since August 31, the United States has directly assisted 479 American Citizens and 450 lawful permanent residents [in addition to their immediate family members] to depart Afghanistan and relocate to the United States.”
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For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whether corporate punishment chills beneficial corporate activity or, in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. A crucial and yet understudied aspect of this debate is empirical evidence. Unlike most other types of crime, the government does not measure corporate crime rates;therefore, the government and researchers alike cannot easily determine whether disputed policies are effectively deterring future incidents of corporate misconduct. In this Article, we take important first steps in addressing these questions. Specifically, we use three novel sources as proxies for corporate crime: the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), consumer complaints made to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and whistleblower complaints made to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Each source reveals an increase in complaints or reports indicative of corporate misconduct over the past decade. We also examine levels of public company recidivism and find that they are likewise on the rise. And we document a potential explanation: recidivist companies are much larger than nonrecidivist companies, but they receive smaller fines than non-recidivist companies (measured as a percentage of market capitalization and revenue). We conclude by offering recommendations for enforcement agencies and policymakers. In particular, our results suggest that enforcers are unlikely to achieve optimal deterrence using fines alone. Enforcement agencies should therefore consider other ways of securing deterrence, such as by seeking penalties against guilty individuals and the top executives who facilitate their crimes.
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RESEARCH SUMMARY: Priorresearch has produced varied results regarding the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on crime rates, depending on the offenses and time periods under investigation. The current study of weekly offense rates in large U.S. cities is based on a longer time period, a greater number of offenses than prior research, and a varying number of cities for each offense (max = 28, min = 13, md = 20). We find that weekly property crime and drug offense rates, averaged across the cities, fell during the pandemic. An exception is motor vehicle theft, which trended upward after pandemic-related population restrictions were instituted in March 2020. Robbery rates also declined immediately after the pandemic began. Average weekly homicide, aggravated assault, and gun assault rates did not exhibit statistically significant increases after March. Beginning in June 2020, however, significant increases in these offenses were detected, followed by declines in the late summer and fall. Fixed-effects regression analyses disclose significant decreases in aggravated assault, robbery, and larceny rates associated with reduced residential mobility during the pandemic. These results support the routine activity hypothesis that the dispersion of activity away from households increases crime rates. The results for the other offenses are less supportive. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: Quarantines and lockdowns, although necessary to reduce contagious illness, are not desirable crime-control devices. An object lesson of the coronavirus pandemic is to redouble effective crime reduction strategies and improve police-community relations without confining people to their homes.
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Research Summary: The onset of extreme social distancing measures is expected to have a dramatic impact on crime. Here, we examine the impact of mandated, city-wide social distancing orders aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 on gang-related crime in Los Angeles. We hypothesize that the unique subcultural processes surrounding gangs may supersede calls to shelter in place and allow gang-related crime to persist. If the normal guardianship of people and property is also disrupted by social distancing, then we expect gang violence to increase. Using autoregressive time series models, we show that gang-related crime remained stable and crime hot spots largely stationary following the onset of shelter in place. Policy Implications: In responding to disruptions to social and economic life on the scale of the present pandemic, both police and civilian organizations need to anticipate continued demand, all while managing potential reductions to workforce. Police are faced with this challenge across a wide array of crime types. Civilian interventionists tasked with responding to gang-related crime need to be prepared for continued peacekeeping and violence interruption activities, but also an expansion of responsibilities to deal with "frontline" or "street-level" management of public health needs.